
Sometimes, in my more conspiratorially-minded moments, I look back on all the awful moves Donald Rumsfeld made as Defense Secretary -- and wonder whether the guy wasn't actually an Iranian mole, sent to sabotage
America's military from within. Chill out, neocons, chill: I'm
only joking. I think.
I'm reading In the Graveyard of Empires, Seth Jones' forthcoming book about Afghanistan. And every few pages, there's another story of Rummy undermining the American effort there. Some of the tales are, by now, well-known -- like shifting CIA and U.S. military assets from Afghanistan to Iraq as early as November, 2001. Others are new, at least to me.
In June 2006, for instance, Major General Robert Durbin was trying to get the funds
to expand the training of Afghan police -- to make sure a growing
insurgency didn't get any bigger. He succeeded eventually, despite resistance from Secretary Rumsfeld.
Seven months earlier, when the Afghans wanted to expand their army, "Rumsfeld read us the riot act," one participant tells Jones. Rummy rejected requests for an Afghan Army of 70,000. Instead, he thought an army with about 50,000 troops was "more reasonable." If Afghans wanted any more soldiers, they'd have to find someone else to pay for it.
Today, Afghanistan's insurgents are in a much stronger position. Now the plan is to grow the 134,000-strong Afghan National Army to 260,000 -- and expand a force of 80,000 cops to 140,000. Thanks again, Rummy.
UPDATE: Leave Rummy alone! Keith Urbahn, former Pentagon speechwriter and current Rumsfeld spokesman, disagrees with this post -- rather strongly. His comments, after the jump.
I don't know who gets it wrong, you reporting on the
views of Seth Jones, Seth Jones reporting on the views of a two-star
general, or a two-star general reporting on the views of someone else,
but somewhere in your three- or four-man game of telephone, the
transmission -- and the facts -- get lost.
The reality was that there was no one pushing harder for improving the
capabilities and expanding the numbers in of the Afghan National Army
and Afghan Police in the leadership of the Defense Department and
probably the Bush administration than Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld wanted
the burdens of maintaining security and executing a counterinsurgency
shifted from U.S. troops to Afghans in Afghanistan and Iraqis in Iraq,
and made expanding the security forces of both nations militaries and
police forces among the highest of priorities. In mid-2006, Rumsfeld
supported expanding the ANA to 70,000 and a step up in the size of the
police force, though there were concerns about the sustainability of a
large force in a relatively poor nation over the long-term -- concerns
that remain to this day. He continues to believe that increasing the
size and capability of the Afghan security forces is one the keys to
mounting a successful counterinsurgency campaign against the Taliban.
Urbahn says he has " no specific knowledge" of the earlier meeting Jones describes in his book. But, anyway, "I do know that what you're suggesting was Rumsfeld's
view in 2006 - and stretching back to 2005 and well before - is 180
degrees from what was actually his view."
Other reports at the time say that the Defense Department pushed back over the expansion of the Afghan army. "Against Kabul's objections, the U.S. military hopes to cut the planned
end-strength of the Afghan defense sector by more than 25 percent;
rather than building the 70,000-man force previously agreed upon, the
goal is now 50,000," wrote the American Enterprise Institute's Vance
Serchuk. He didn't name Rumsfeld specifically as the force behind the
reduced goal. It very well could have been someone else.
Also, it's interesting to note that two weeks after Rumsfeld's departure from the Pentagon was announced, the commander on the ground in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, proposed an acceleration of the plan to expand the Afghan army. Instead of getting to 70,000 men by 2011, he and Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak
called for fielding a 70,000-member Afghan army by October 2008. Again,
this may or may not have had anything to do with Rumsfeld.
Anyway, my favorite moment in my e-mail exchange with Urbahn came
this morning, when I was in the middle of interviews for another piece.
"Are you going to append my comments?" he wrote. "I think if you're going to accuse
Rumsfeld of 'blowing the war in Afghanistan' and do it on spurious
grounds, that's your prerogative, but if you're a professional
journalist and not a two-bit blogger, I think you at least owe the
reader the other side."
"Two-bit blogger" -- I kinda like the sound of that, actually.
[Photo: U.S. Northern Command]

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